1977). Ecologists study trade-offs from an environmental selection point of view, at the population level. They noticed that an alignment strategy has long-lasting consequences for an organization, because attempts at subsequent strategy changes are severely hindered by structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Hannan, P o olos and Carroll, 2004) . Organizations can be proficient, but they can't readily adapt their potential capabilities when the environment changes, so they might get stuck with an obsolete strategy that was once beneficial.
In organizational ecology, the environment is modeled as a (changing) combination of resources. Different types of trade-offs are then contingent upon different types of environmental change. A first trade-off ecologists studied was either being a generalist and moderately efficient at handling diverse resource combinations, or being a specialist and being proficient at dealing with one resource combination, but running the risk of failure in case of environmental change (niche width theory, Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Freeman and Hannan, 1983) . A second trade-off was either being able to enter new markets (resource combinations) quickly as a first mover, at the expense of being less efficient like the generalist in the former case, or developing efficient organizational routines, and enter the market later as an efficient producer (propagation strategy theory, Brittain and Freeman, 1980) . Each of these two trade-offs has been treated in a theory fragment of organizational ecology, but these two fragments are yet unrelated. A third trade-off, which we want to develop here is not yet covered by ecological theory, though it was hinted at in the Hannan-Freeman niche theory, as we point this out later. This trade-off is between either reaping as many as possible short term benefits from a beneficial resource period, without creating provisions for adverse times, or investing in social capital, by developing durable network contacts and supportive institutions to create more favorable conditions when resources become sparse.
These three trade-offs are clearly different yet seem to have things in common. If we would now attempt to develop a common framework in natural language only, though, we would, as Charles Peirce said, have to ''wallow helplessly in a rich mud of conceptions'' (Peirce, 1878) . Thus we follow his suggestion on ''how to make our ideas clear,'' and resort to formal logic to increase rigor and precision. Logic has been applied successfully to fragments of organizational ecology and numerous other theories (Péli et al., 1994; Huang, Masuch and P o olos, 1996; Kamps and P o olos, 1999; Péli, P o olos and Hannan, 2000; Vermeulen and Bruggeman, 2001 ; P o olos, Hannan and Carroll, 2001 ). In our treatment of organizational trade-offs, each formula will be accompanied by its natural language-counterpart.
A logical formalization consists of two alternating phases, (1) a rational reconstruction of a text or set of ideas, in which a core theory, its key concepts and its logical structure are being sharpened, anticipating (2) a formalization proper, wherein the core theory is represented in a formal language, and logical properties like consistency and soundness are rigorously checked (Bruggeman and Vermeulen, 2002) . We formalize in standard First Order Logic, which is well developed and widely applied (Kyburg, 1968) . 1 A theory in First Order Logic is consistent if it has at least one model in which all sentences of the theory are true; an inconsistent theory can't be interpreted in any model. 2 Once consistency is established, an automated theorem prover takes as input the negation of a theorem candidate and a set of premises from which it should follow logically. If the theorem prover finds a contradiction, the negated theorem is false, so the theorem is true. If this doesn't work (and typos have been removed), the formalizer is forced to improve the rational reconstruction, and subsequently prove the soundness and consistency of the improved theory.
Before starting our formalization, we explain the general conception of environmental change (Section 1), and present the three trade-offs in greater detail (Section 2). For the new Cricket and Ant trade-off, we rationally reconstruct the basic ideas first (Section 3), and then formalize the new argument (Section 4). The generalistspecialist theory and the first-mover-efficient-producer theory have been formalized in First Order Logic earlier. Here we will show that when one changes the instances of the actors in the Cricket and Ant model, as well as the type of resource change, the two other theory fragments are obtained as variant cases (Sections 5 and 6). So our 1 Other scholars use non-monotonic logic, an extension of First Order Logic (P o olos, Hannan and Carroll, 2001; Hannan, Carroll and P o olos, 2003) . An advantage of nonmonotonic logic is that it can deal with exceptions, by replacing the universal quantifier (''for all '', 8) by ''normally,'' for empirical generalizations, or by ''ad hoc,'' for model simplifications that aren't part of the substantive theory. Accordingly, conclusions drawn from a premise set containing such quantifiers lose their (potential) universally quantified status, because ''for all'' is replaced by ''presumably.,'' An important reason for us to use First Order Logic is that it can be handled by current theorem prover softwares. Our formalization can be transformed into non-monotonic logic by appropriately substituting the above-mentioned quantifiers for our universal quantifiers.
2
A formal theory is a set of sentences in a formal language, such as First Order Logic, with an inference system; the set of sentences is closed under logical deduction, and its theorems are validly inferred from premises according to rules of inference. For sufficiently detailed but still easy to read textbooks on First Order Logic, the reader may consult Gamut (1991) or Barwise and Etchemendy (1990) . Our formal theory has been checked by Otter and Mace, which are freely available on the Web (http://www-unix. mcs.anl.gov/AR/otter/).
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CA model can also be regarded as a ''switchboard'' to other theory fragments. This is a step towards, although not yet a grand unification. The main text finishes with a discussion (Section 7), while the technical details are deferred to the appendix.
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
In organizational ecology, the environment is conceptualized as a configuration of resources, which a focal population of organizations might exploit. The most important organizational resource that organizational ecologists take into account is people's demand for organizational products and services (Carroll and Hannan, 2000) . The carriers of demand are humans, characterized by a number of social or taste characteristics that influence their decisions in respect of taking or refuting an organization's offering. Markets are seen as a multidimensional resource spaces in which axes stand for ''resource variables'' that determine people's tastes with respect to an organizational offering. 3 The resource space can be a socio-demographic space of n social characteristics (the so called Blau-space, McPherson, 2003) . Having political organizations, the resource space can be a political space of n issues along which voters position themselves (Downs, 1957) . In economic contexts, the resource space can be a Lancasterian commodity space where products are displayed by n scales along which customers take their preference positions (Lancaster, 1966) .
To simplify continuous changes of resources, ecologists approximate environmental dynamics by discrete patches, where each patch is a time period with one dominant resource state, i.e., a configuration of resources; to simplify further, the basic environmental model has two alternating patches, for example a summer and a winter season. Discrete resource states are not just model simplifications but are often socially constructed and meaningful. For example, anti-mass-production cultural sentiments and conspicuous status consumption lead to clearcut distinctions between resource states in the American beer market, one for massproduced beers and another for microbrewery products (Carroll, Dobrev and Swaminathan 2002) . Microbreweries proliferate not only because of consumers' preference for authentic tastes, but also as a ''postmaterialistic'' cultural reaction to mass-production, leading to a polarization of tastes. To drink beers in brewpubs has a status consumption aspect as well, especially among highly educated professionals. Social identity 3 This conceptualization of resource as demand concerns the output side of organizations, i.e., their products and services. In other disciplines, resource typically concerns organizational input (e.g., raw materials, employees, and financial resources).
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G. Pe´li and J. Bruggeman entices certain types of consumption and can be shown (off) in these consumptions; it therefore has an impact upon the resource landscape and has received increasing interest from organizational ecologists beyond the brewery example (P o olos, Hannan and Carroll, 2001; McKendrick and Carroll, 2001 ). In our example, the co-evolvement of the microbrewery movement and identity formation resulted in two resource states (note that these two states do not alternate but coexist in time, although over the entire history of the population, there were first microbrewerylike organizations, that in the past century were out-competed by large industrial beer producers, until in the early nineteen-eighties the microbreweries took off). Three parameters characterize the pattern of environmental change, dissimilarity, variability and grain. Their values are discrete (Figure 1 ), although their ranges, as well as the number of different patches, can be extended in order to cope with more complex patterns of change, and can closely approximate continuous change (Bruggeman and Ó Nuall a ain, 2000). Environmental dissimilarity tells the magnitude of difference between the two or more patches. The bigger this difference, the more difficult it is for organizations to cope with both environmental conditions. Quantitative dissimilarities in resource conditions can be illustrated by the difference between the zenith and nadir points of economic cycles. Qualitative dissimilarities in resource conditions denote the differences of demand between, say, spring and summer collections in the retail industry. In spatial terms, high qualitative demand dissimilarity means that the location of spring demand falls far from summer demand in the resource space. The distinction is further elaborated in Section 2.
Environmental variability is about the relative duration of patches; it can tell if either one environmental condition holds most of the time, or if alternating conditions take equal share. If two different patches are roughly the same duration, variability is high, if one patch is much shorter that the other, representing only a transient period of change that is relatively easy for an organization to sit out, variability is low. For example, if depression and prosperity periods are about the same length in an economic cycle, then the variability of this resource change is high. The sales of turkey over the year and in short periods prior to feasts like Christmas and Thanksgiving feature low temporal variability. 4 Stable conditions are an extreme case of low variability. Environmental grain characterizes the absolute length of patches. In case of coarse grain, the average patch length is long. In case of fine grain, patches are short on average. Industries with seasonal fluctuations of demand (e.g., electricity suppliers) or with multiple year long business cycles (e.g., car producers, real estate brokers) represent coarse grained resource change. Weekly or daily quantitative fluctuations (fast food restaurants) are fine grained, or even very fine grained, changes.
ORGANIZATIONAL TRADE-OFFS
In a first model (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) , resource changes are exogenous to the population, and the sequence of alternating patches comprises of two qualitatively different resource states, E 1 and E 2 , for example different customer tastes. Here the trade-off is between organizational niche breadth and performance, through the ''principle of allocation'' (Levins, 1968; Hannan, Carroll and P o olos, 2003) of some given amount of adaptive capacity. Generalist organizations can 4 There are other possible interpretations of variability (e. g., the breadth of the product range offered), but they are not captured by our model.
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G. Pe´li and J. Bruggeman cope with qualitatively different resource environments. But adaptation to different environments by maintaining a broad niche involves the jack-of-all-trades dilemma: generalists do reasonably well in multiple environments but they excel in none. Specialists bet on a narrow niche (here, one resource environment) and perform there excellently. 5 Depending on the pattern of change, then, specialists or generalists have higher fitness. As a short hand, we write GS for this generalist-specialist trade-off theory. Péli (1997) gave a logical formalization of this so-called niche theory and derived the theory's main conclusions as theorems from the theory's basic assumptions (see also Hannan, Carroll and P o olos, 2003) . Bruggeman (1997) also formalized niche width theory, although based on a slightly different reading of the source texts. In this paper, we stick to Péli's reading.
In a second model, the external environmental resource offer stays more or less the same but organizations bound free resources as the focal population grows, from an initially empty population till population mass meets the carrying capacity of the environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Brittain and Freeman 1980 ). An example is an empty population at the appearance of a new technology or product; the population grows till the market is saturated. Here, resource changes are endogenous and quantitative: free resources disappear due to competition within a growing population. The trade-off organizations face is between r-and K-strategies, named after parameters in an old Lotka-Volterra model (1925) . First mover r-strategists can proliferate rapidly under conditions of resource abundance, whereas K-strategists take their time to invest in development of more efficient routines that enables them to survive in crowded markets. We call this RK theory, of which Péli and Masuch (1997) gave a logical formalization.
In a famous cautionary tale of La Fontaine (1966) , an ant spends its summer with hard work collecting food for winter. A cricket lives for the day, playing his violin during the summer, but suffers from hunger in winter frost. Organizations may face a similar trade-off. In a third environmental model, that we here introduce and was not addressed in organizational ecology, resource changes are again exogenous, as in the GS model, but the difference between the two types of patches is quantitative. There is an initial period characterized by a substantial external resource supply (a ''summer'' patch), followed by a second period when external resource supply stops or diminishes to a very low 5 Maintaining parallel routines is not always costly. For example, robotics allows producing specialized versions of generic car models at request, without considerable additional costs (mass customization). Then, the ''principle of allocation'' may not hold, and the predictions of niche theory do not hold either.
The Cricket and the Antvalue (''winter''); there may then be an alternating pattern of these two patches as in the GS and RK models. Alternating conjunctural and depression periods in economics demonstrate this pattern of resource change. Then, the organizational trade-off is between rapid growth and security. Rapid growth results in a population with many or large organizations with minimal reserves. The slower growth alternative makes better preparation possible for bad times (winter). This preparation may simply mean accumulating financial reserves that can be utilized when resource gets temporarily scarce. This is what Joseph, advisor of Pharaoh in the Old Testament, did. He purchased and stored a grain stock in prosperous years, driven by the revelation that seven years of plenty would be followed by seven years of famine. 6 Alternatively, preparation for bad times may imply spending financial assets on developing beneficial institutions and social capital through network ties. Both ways of preparation result in relatively slower growth. Building social capital takes time and effort, first to create trust and then to maintain the established ties, which in their turn enforce conformity (Krackhardt, 1999 ) that limits entrepreneurial freedom. In winters of high uncertainty and limited resource supply, the network may support the organizations tied to it, increasing chances of survival. We call this the cricket and ant trade-off, CA for short.
We have now three ways of how environmental resources change and three corresponding organizational trade-offs. The three cases can mix in actuality, but for analytical clarity we address them separately. Our first task is to give an account of population dynamics in case of exogenous and quantitative environmental change, as this is not treated in organizational ecology. We give the environmental selection differences between the Cricket and the Ant strategies in all eight patterns of environmental change depicted in Figure 1 . CA is the stepping-stone for the second, main task of the paper, to point out connections between the three trade-off theory fragments by specifying a common formal core for them.
The three population arguments overlap in key notions and also in their characterization of environmental change and strategy. This gives an opportunity to merge them into one, in a way that the new general theory gives back the three components (CA, GS and RK) as special cases. Consider the specific assumptions of each of the three population trade-off models, respectively, as ''switch positions'' in a general theory. Setting the switch into GS, RK, and CA positions, the selection predictions of the pertaining component theory should 6 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this example.
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G. Pe´li and J. Bruggeman obtain as outputs (theorems) of the general theory. The predictions of GS and RK are given in advance by current theory. The predictions of CA will be derived by logical formalization in Section 4. But before doing so, we elaborate on the CA trade-off in natural language in the forthcoming section.
THE CRICKET AND THE ANT
Consider two organizational populations, the Cricket and the Ant, as subpopulations of one larger population, and whose members follow two different strategies respectively. (We refer to the member organizations of these subpopulations as ''crickets'' and ''ants,'' respectively.) We want to compare their long term performance from a Darwinian selection perspective, under different patterns of environmental change ( Figure 1 ). Selection's preference is for (sub)populations with higher organizational mass in the long run, which may turn up in the number or in the aggregated size of the pertaining organizations.
In either case, larger mass requires higher growth, which has to be achieved under changing resource conditions. In the CA environmental model, there are high seasons with bountiful resources and low seasons characterized by a lack of resources, called summer and winter, respectively. Creating strong network ties to cope with resource fluctuations takes time and effort. How well organizations can create them depends on the duration and the resourcefulness of the summer. Population mass accumulation during summer can proceed in two ways. A population may grow in mass, in terms of the size or number of members (Cricket), or it may grow slower, being composed of less, or relatively smaller, but network-wise better equipped organizations (Ant). However, if the summer is long or resourceful (or both), then even the growth-oriented Cricket population's members can develop some modest assets or some supportive network ties to survive a short winter. In the formal model, coarse grained environmental change will mean lengthy summers; high dissimilarity between summer and winter resource availabilities will indicate a resourceful summer. Obviously, the crickets' strategy is the best option in case of eternal summers. But when reserves are used up in winters and no other back up is available, organizational numbers fall dramatically, and population mass dwindles.
Example: Coordinated vs. Liberal Market Economies
Business systems in different countries (Whitley, 2002) provide an example for the Cricket=Ant trade-off. Business systems are assessed
The Cricket and the Antin economic terms, but their success depends on the underlying institutional arrangements and on the existence and the nature of the networks between economic entities. A well-known typology of business systems makes a difference between two broad types, the so called liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies, CMEs for short (Soskice, 2002) . Liberal market economies stay close to the text-book type models of capitalism, wherein the market is populated by a large number of individual firms. Market forces are not too much affected by cartels, regulations, and monopolies and the influence of the state and of social institutions is low. Firms are opportunistic (''arm-length'' contracting), and industry level cooperation between competitor firms is not typical. Labor force training is task-and firm-specific and takes place mostly within the firms, while employer-employee relations are market based. Company financing is impersonal (stock market based), and it is governed by short term and high risk-taking considerations. Countries of the AngloSaxon world exemplify LMEs.
In coordinated market economies, institutions including the state have a strong influence on economic processes. Contracting relations are more stable and firms intend to build on trust and mutual advantages with partners. Industry level cooperation between competitors is typical: industrial chambers regulate market entry and competition, standards are established, and the training of the labor force takes place in educational institutions financed by the industry or by the state. Employer-employee relations feature elements of reciprocity, and trade-unions are also partners, not only antagonists of the employers. The typical way of company financing is based on bank loans. Banks are stakeholders and often shareholders of the firms they finance. Risk avoidance and taking into account long term effects are crucial elements of coordinated market economies. Countries of the ''Rhineland capitalism'' (Germany, the Netherlands) are typical representatives of CMEs. 7 How does this setting fit to the Cricket=Ant framework? Now, environmental change comes in the form of economic cycles. ''Summer'' and ''winter'' stand for subsequent conjunctural and depression phases. Strong=weak conjunctural periods are modeled by either more or less resourceful summers, during which resource (demand) is high or modest, respectively. In the first case, environmental dissimilarity (the difference between summer and winter conditions) is large, and in the 7 Business system comparisons emphasize the institutional environment. Institutions may also facilitate cooperation between competitors, e. g., establishing industrial chambers, or pooling resources for training workers in CMEs.
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G. Pe´li and J. Bruggeman second case it is low. The length of the cycles is captured by environmental grain size. Low variability means that a lengthy conjunctural phase dominates the economic cycle, while high variability means that depressions are about the same length as the conjunctural periods. An LME corresponds to a Cricket population in the proposed model. Firms are risk-takers in this business system and opportunistically seize short-term growth possibilities. A CME is the analogue of the risk-averse Ant population. Organizations are less competitive: they trade in a part of their growth potential for safety considerations. Their collective institutional arrangements and network ties confine their set of actions and dampen their growth during conjunctural periods, analogously to the Ant's reserve accumulation during summer. These arrangements, however, may help them to sit out depressions. Our logical formalization on this argument will make possible to derive predictions on the relative success of different business systems, in more complex environmental settings which are new to that literature.
A FORMAL CRICKET AND ANT MODEL Environmental Change
First, we characterize the temporal patterns of environmental change. We give a set of logical statements (assumptions) on the three environmental variables: dissimilarity, variability and grain. The symbols applied are explained in Table 1 and the most relevant logical formulae are displayed in Tables 2-3.   8 Figure 1 displays temporal sequences composed of two subsequent patches. Each patch stands for a time period for which a certain environmental state (in the CA case: summer or winter) holds. Sequences composed of two subsequent patches are long enough to represent the patterns of environmental resource change that obtain by combining the values of the three environmental variables (Péli, 1997) . For empirical studies, however, sometimes several subsequent sequences have to pass to observe significant differences in selection outcomes, especially if the component patches are short (very fine grain, see A6). When the same kind of two-patch sequences repeat for a longer period of time, we get cyclical environmental change. Our results for sequences can be generalized to cyclical changes as well, provided that some organizations still stay alive at the end of the cycle. It is possible, however, that the winner strategy then 8 The complet set of formulae, which includes technical assumtions, e. g., on properties of inequalities, is available upon request from the first author. achieves a Pyrrhus victory and gets hurt so badly that it dies out shortly after the observation period.
We address those cases when summers are not shorter than winters, giving the populations under consideration a chance to build networks and institutions or to increase mass. The first assumption (A1 , Table 2 ) states this consideration. The cases when the winter periods are substantially longer than summers are uniform in the sense that the risk-taking Cricket population collapses after running out of resources (except for the case of very fine grained environmental change, treated later on). The second assumption (A2, Table 2) states that low environmental variability means that one environmental patch is much longer than the other. High environmental variability, -the dissimilarity between the two seasons is low=high Grain(coarse)=Grain(fine) -the grain of environmental change is coarse=fine Pop(x)
-object x is a population Selection favors(x,y) -selection favors object x over object y Var(low)=Var(high) -environmental variability is low=high x >> y -x is much larger than y Functions beg(t) -yields the beginning point of period t dur(t)
-yields the duration of period t end(t)
-yields the endpoint of period t mass(x,t) -yields the mass of x in period t reserve(x) -the amount of reserves for x res av(t) -the resource availability during t 216 G. Pe´li and J. Bruggeman in contrast, means that summers and winters are by and large of the same duration (A3, Table 2 ). Assumptions 1 and 2 imply Lemma 1, a simple intermediary theorem that will be useful to derive more relevant predictions later on:
L1. If environmental variability is low, then summers are longer than winters.
Environmental grain deals with the average durations of the environmental patches. If grain is coarse, then seasonal durations are long on the average. A4 reflects this fact by stipulating that at least one of the two seasons is long (that is, the summer or the winter or both are long). If grain is fine, neither of the seasons is long (A5, Table 2 ). Although environmental grain is a dichotomous variable (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) , the present application requires referring also to cases when environmental conditions are extremely volatile. This ''very fine'' grain is described by postulating that seasons are short or very short (A6 , Table 2 ). So, environmental grain can have three distinct values: very fine, fine and coarse. This fact, together with A5-6 implies Lemma 2:
L2. If environmental grain is fine, then some seasons are medium long.
9
GrainðfineÞ ! durðWÞ ¼ medium _ durðSÞ ¼ medium Environmental dissimilarity reflects the difference between the seasons' nurturing conditions expressed in terms of resource availability. Resource availability can be high or low in summer. Since resource availability is always very low in winter (A7, Table 2), the summerwinter difference in resource availability depends only on summer's resource level (Figure 2 ). High environmental dissimilarity means TABLE 3 Formulae on Population Dynamics A9. The Cricket population grows large in summer, the Ant population remains small. mass(C,end(S)) ¼ large^mass(A,end(S)) ¼ small A10. The exhaustion period of reserves is long for the Ant. dur(reserve(A)) ¼ long A11. The Cricket has very short winter survival on reserves if the summer is neither long nor resourceful; otherwise, it has a short survival period Model modification for the GS fragment: A9
GS
. The Specialist population grows large by the end of the E 1 period; the Generalist population's mass is small at the end of the second (E 2 ) period. mass(S,end(E 1 )) ¼ large^mass(G,end(E 2 )) ¼ small The derivation of theorems usually requires a number of premises stating background knowledge (e.g., on inequality and on scales) that we do not mention in the running text.
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G. Pe´li and J. Bruggeman that resource availability is much higher in summer than in winter (A8, Table 2 ). Assumptions 7-8 imply Lemma 3:
L3. Environmental dissimilarity is high, if and only if, resource availability is high in summer.
Diss(high) $ res av(S) ¼ high
Otherwise, environmental dissimilarity is low. Exuberant summer resources make the summer population growth steeper. Since having a resourceful summer means having high dissimilarity between summer and winter conditions, environmental dissimilarity is here indicative for the speed of population mass accumulation during summers. We will now discuss Cricket and Ant population mass changes.
Population Mass Changes in Summer and Winter
The crickets try to maximize their growth as long as summer lasts. The ants' concern is safety; they develop network ties and assets to ensure the continuity of operations under poor winter resource conditions. Both cricket and ant increase in mass during summer. However, the (sub)population mass at the end of summer depends on the adopted resource allocation strategy. Assumption 9 (Table 3) expresses that the cricket grows faster during good times. We now represent the trade-off between fast growth and social capital. The ants opt for the second, so they can survive on reserves for a long period of time (A10, Table 3). A considerable advantage of social capital is FIGURE 2 Low and high dissimilarity between summer and winter.
The Cricket and the Antthat during bad times it does not decline as fast as economic capital and can still be used when other sources run dry. The building and maintenance of social capital requires efforts that can go at the expense of growth. One specific way of establishing long-term business relations is offering somewhat lower prices, thus partly sacrificing profits in exchange for stable relations. In general, investment in relations entails other costs as well. For example, keeping an old and reliable supplier when receiving a financially better offer from a new supplier (a normal practice in CMEs) has opportunity costs. With the ''arm-length'' contracting practices in LMEs, firms do not face this opportunity cost; however, they do not have the advantages of stable relations either. The crickets have poorly developed social capital, but favorable summer conditions may slightly improve their winter chances. Long summers allow accumulating some reserves; similarly, resourceful, nurturing summers (high summer-winter dissimilarity) have the same beneficial effect. If either of the two conditions applies, the crickets' survival period is a bit extended. If none of these conditions applies, then the cricket population's mass collapses after a short time in winter. In model terms: the crickets' survival period is short in the first case and it is very short in the second case, see A11 and Table 3 .
The next formulae spell out the consequences of winter resource conditions on the two populations. If social capital or reserves hold all winter, then the population preserves its mass during winter (A12 , Table 3 ). If reserves do not last for the whole winter, then the fate of the cricket depends on the length of the period without reserves. If the winter is much longer than reserves allow for, the population collapses: its mass becomes very small (A13 , Table 3 ). But if the winter is only a little longer than the burnout period on reserves, the losses are not fatal, and population's mass is not very much smaller at the end of the winter than its maximal summer mass was (A14, Table 3 ).
The last piece of information needed to derive theorems on survival advantages of Cricket and Ant populations is a formal characterization of environmental selection. Assumption 15 (Table 3) states that selection's favor is for the population of larger mass at the end of the cycle (i.e., at the end of the winter). It is useful to make a distinction between the process and the outcome of selection. The selection process takes place all over the time during the summer-winter periods. But selection's outcome can only be assessed at the end of the day. With Assumption 15, we adopt Darwin's solution: he inferred to the work of selection processes by ''looking backward'', by searching for effects that had led to the configuration of species he found.
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Theorems
The above set of assumptions now implies environmental selection preferences as theorems (Table 4) . Figure 3 gives a visual representation of population dynamics in the eight environmental patterns. 10 The first theorem posits that conditions of low variability are more favorable for the cricket (Figures 3a-d) . Since in our context low variability means that summers are definitely longer than winters (Lemma 1), Theorem 1 just rephrases the common wisdom that saving is not that important if hard times are transient.
Theorem 1.
(from A1-6, A9-12 and A14-15; Table 4 : 1-2, 5-6) If environmental variability is low, then selection favors the Cricket population over the Ant.
Var(low) ! Selection favors(C,A) The La Fontaine tale says that the ant fares better than the cricket if winter is long. Winter can be long in absolute terms, or it can be long relative to the summer. Coarse environmental grain means long winter in absolute terms. High variability means long winters in relative terms, i.e., that the winters and summers are similar in duration (A3). If the two effects combine, the cricket fails (Figures 3e-f 
Theorem 2. (from A1-4, A9-13 and A15; Table 4 : 3, 7)
If environmental change is of high variability and the change is coarse grained, then selection favors the Ant population.
VarðhighÞ^GrainðcoarseÞ ! Selection favorsðA; CÞ Two environmental change patterns out of eight await explanation. If grain is fine, then the absolute length of winter isn't long. This may give a chance to the cricket to survive, provided that its members have Very fine grain, without respect to variability=dissimilarity: 9. Cricket some minimal reserves. Thus, selection's preference depends on the resourcefulness of the summer. In case of high environmental dissimilarity, the resourceful summer helps the crickets to develop some minimal reserves, and so, to survive and prevail (Figure 3g ), otherwise, the Ant is favored (Figure 3h ). 
When Grain Gets Really Fine
The term ''very fine grain'' was introduced as a third, distinct grain category to reflect conditions when seasons can be very short (A6, Table 2 ). This concept is not part of the original GS and RK environmental models, only of the CA model. The finer grain size is, the shorter are the environmental patches on the average, so the more frequent the change of environmental conditions. The reason for handling very fine grain separately is that otherwise the phrasing of Theorem 4 might run against intuition for certain cases when environmental change is very fast. Figure  3h indicates that the mass of the cricket does not necessarily undercut the mass of the ant if the seasons (and so the winter) are very short, that is, grain is very fine. You can visualize this by gradually shortening the summer and winter periods, for example in Figure 3h . Having a very short winter, even a very short survival period on reserves enables the cricket to sustain. An additional effect comes from the time consuming aspect of investment in social capital: very short summers may not be sufficient to develop immunity for winter, and so the solid line of the ant population in Figure 3h may also decline when grain is very fine. These two effects point into the same direction, flipping selection's favor to the cricket. This prediction follows as a fifth theorem from our formal machinery.
Theorem 5. (from A6, A9-12 and A14-15; see Table 4 : 9)
If the grain of environmental change is very fine, then selection favors the Cricket population over the Ant.
Grain(very fine) ! Selection favors(C,A)
From here on, no more formal model building is necessary. The task becomes to operate the ''switchboard,'' that is, to fine-tune the CA machinery to deduce the conclusions of GS and RK. Again, the emphasis is on the sociological insights: What are the differences between the three addressed population trade-offs? We begin with organizational ecology's niche-width theory (GS). We follow Hannan's and Freeman's (1989) description and denotations.
GS THEORY Generalist and Specialists in Changing Resource Environments
In GS, two resource environments (E 1 and E 2 ) follow each other sequentially, like in CA. The eight patterns of environmental change 224 G. Pe´li and J. Bruggeman are the same as in CA (Figure 1) . But while the difference between the two alternating resource states is quantitative in CA (presence and lack of external resource offer), in GS it's qualitative: E 1 and E 2 represent two different resource configurations. Organizations in the generalist population adapt to both E 1 and E 2 in the sense that they can operate under both conditions (broad niche). The specialist population adapts only to E 1 (narrow niche). The principle of allocation (Hannan, Carroll and P o olos, 2003 , see also Section 2) has it that an ability to operate under both conditions takes its toll: it lowers fitness, so generalist organizations have a mediocre performance all the time. On the contrary, specialists perform well under a narrow range of conditions (E 1 ) in which they specialized. For them, no resource utilization is possible when E 2 holds sway, and then they have to survive on reserves. Specialist organizations bet on the performance of operations, generalists bet on the continuity of operations. Table 5 and Figure 4 display the predictions of GS on selection preferences. In the four low variability cases E 1 dominates (Figure 1b) , and specialization is the strategy favored by selection. But when environmental variability is high, specialists face beneficial and hostile conditions for approximately the same duration. If the E 2 periods are long, specialists run out of their reserves, just like the cricket members in CA, and their population collapses. Therefore, generalism is the favored strategy in the two cases when high variability combines with coarse grain. However, if variability is high but grain is fine, then the E 2 patches are not deadly long for specialists. In these cases, selection's preference depends on the dissimilarity between the two environmental states. The bigger the dissimilarity, the more difficult it is for a generalist to adapt to both E 1 and E 2 , and this implies lower fitness, according to the principle of allocation. Therefore, high variability and fine grain combined with high dissimilarity are better for specialists, while the same setting with low dissimilarity is better for generalists. The next step is to show that the Very fine grain, without respect to variability=dissimilarity: 9. Specialists
The Cricket and the Antformal CA model implies these predictions as theorems, provided that some modifications are performed.
Modifications
Environmental change has the same ''good times -bad times'' character for the specialists in GS as it has for both the Cricket and Ant in CA. The specialist population behaves as the cricket: it flourishes when E 1 (summer) holds. E 2 is inaccessible and virtually resource-less for specialists, while it is resourceful for generalists. However, the costs of adaptation to both environmental conditions (lower fitness) slow down the growth of the generalist population. Note the analogy with the ant population's damped growth in summer because of accumulation of social capital and other buffering efforts. Both generalists and ants have a kind of life insurance against environmental change, where the policy costs come in the form of slower growth. The generalist organizations maintain multiple operational routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) , one for E 1 and another for E 2 , to be able to cope with qualitative resource changes. In the pertaining formulae, substitute Specialist (S) for Cricket (C), and Generalist (G) for Ant (A) ( Tables 2 and 3) . Similarly, substitute E 1 and E 2 for summer (S) and winter (W), respectively. Until this point, only notational modifications were made. The only non-notational modification concerns the fact that the generalist population can grow in both environmental patches (E 1 and E 2 ), while the ant can only grow in the summer patch. At the level of formal machinery, this difference means that the generalist population may change its mass until the end of the second period (E 2 ) while the ant reached its maximum mass at the end of the first period (summer) in CA. This modification affects only formula A9; its GS-version is denoted as A9 GS (Table 3) . Moreover, A10 becomes superfluous, since now the generalist population is active in both periods, so it need not survive on reserves, or on supportive institutions or social capital. These two changes don't affect Theorems 1-4, and we get exactly the predictions on selection preferences of organizational ecology's niche width theory (compare Tables 4 and 5) .
Theorem 5 on very fine grain also applies to GS. Specialists, the analogues of crickets, can easily buffer the very short E 2 -periods to which they are not adapted. Generalists, the analogues of ants, can operate, and therefore grow, during both in E 1 -and E 2 periods. For them, the negative effects of very fine grain come in the form of fixed switching costs between their different production routines that correspond to the qualitatively different resource conditions. When change comes very frequently, they have no time to recover the costs of routine shift during the very short temporal spells.
RK THEORY
K-and r-strategists K-and r-strategist organizations have been introduced to organizational ecology by Brittain and Freeman in their propagation strategy theory (1980; see also Hannan and Freeman, 1989) . K and r denote, respectively, the carrying capacity of the environment and the intrinsic growth rate of the population. K-strategists have competitive advantages over r-strategists due to their efficient production on the basis of well-developed routines when the carrying capacity of the environment is approximated, and free resources become progressively scarce. First mover r-strategists, in contrast, have low start up costs and an ability to exploit new opportunities quickly, but they perform poorer under high competitive pressure and resource scarcity. Putting it differently, K-strategists bet on performance and efficiency, while r-strategists bet on rapid proliferation. The relative success of the two strategies depends on the stability of environmental conditions. The r-strategists flourish in the short run, while K-strategists' investments in routines yield their returns in the long run, if there is a long run at all, so if the environment is stable or only slowly changing (Hannan and Freeman, 1989, pp. 118-120) . When markets change faster than K-strategists can reap their returns on skill investments, r-strategists fare better. In this theory fragment, the r-strategist population's analogue is the Cricket population. The Ant population is the analogue of the K-strategist population, whose members now develop production skills instead of social capital.
A difference between the two environmental models is that while CA is about two distinct environmental resource periods, one with and one without resources, RK assumes permanent resource inflow for organizations (e.g., in the form of ongoing customer demand) for the whole observation period. In RK, the two environmental patches are kept apart by the time point when the carrying capacity is reached (Péli and Masuch, 1997) . This point splits market history into two phases: an initial p 1 period with free (yet unbounded) resources, and a subsequent p 2 period when free resources have been absorbed by organizations (supply matches or exceeds consumer demand). Putting it differently, resource availability is high in p 1 and low in p 2 , while resource inflow (market demand) in absolute terms is by and large stable all the time. Resource acquisition during p 2 resembles to a zero-sum game, where the gain of one organization comes from the losses of others. Environmental dissimilarity here deals with the magnitude of the resource availability gap between p 1 and p 2 . The competitive market phase ( p 2 ) ends when some new market opportunities open up that give rise to a new wave of first mover (r-strategist) organizations. This yields a ''two-stroke'' RK model similar to CA, but whereas in the latter resource availability is determined by external sources, in RK resource availability depends on endogenous competitive pressure, which is low in p 1 and high in p 2 . Our next step is to derive the theory's conclusions on selection preferences concerning the two organizational strategies by again performing some modifications on CA.
Modifications
To obtain RK theory, denote r-and K-strategist (sub)populations by r and K, respectively. Substitute r for C and K for A in all pertaining formulae in Tables 2 and 3 . Moreover, substitute p 1 for summer S and p 2 for winter W. The obtaining predictions of RK theory on selection preferences are listed in Table 6 . Recall that the original theory claims that selection favors K-strategists if environmental change is slow, 228 G. Pe´li and J. Bruggeman and that it favors r-strategists when change is rapid. Translating the original predictions (that didn't characterize the environment in terms of variability, grain size and dissimilarity), the expectation becomes that coarse grained change favors K-strategists, while fine grained change favors r-strategists (see the logical formalization of RK theory in Péli and Masuch, 1997) . Table 6 shows partly opposing predictions, though: only five conclusions (cf. cells 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8) out of eight match the expectation. However, the match of the original theory's predictions and ours improves radically by adding one more modification. The original theory (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) mentions that the first mover versus efficient producer trade-off takes place in markets with a set of new opportunities (e.g., due to technological or market structure change) that attracts new entrants. In our terms, this means a supporting, resourceful climate that facilitates rapid organizational founding and growth. Resourceful conditions in the early phase imply high environmental dissimilarity between the two phases compared (Lemma 3), to which the original first mover-efficient producer argument should be restricted. Then, the upper row of Table 6 (the low dissimilarity cases, cells 1-4) does not apply, as these conditions didn't exist in the original theory either. In cells 6, 7 and 8 (Table 6) , coarse grained environmental change favors K-strategists, and fine grained change favors r-strategists, as the original argument states. One misfit is left (cell 5) to be solved. The next section suggests a solution to this problem by somewhat loosening the constraints of RK.
Revisiting the Excluded Cases
The environmental conditions excluded in the previous section may occur in reality, and it would be of interest to generalize RK theory Very fine grain, without respect to variability=dissimilarity: 9. r-strat
The Cricket and the Antto encompass these cases as well (Table 6 : 1-4). Note that the original r-and K-strategist argument takes into account only one environmental parameter, the speed of change (here represented by environmental grain). Our formal model also takes into account the influence of the other two parameters, variability and dissimilarity, and suggests that the impact of these two might sometimes overrule grain size. Let us relax the assumption that the r and K-strategy dilemma only applies to cases when the opening market is abundant of resources (demand). Now, we revisit the four low dissimilarity cases (Table 6 : 1-4) in which the conclusions derived from our formal model contradict to the original theory in two instances, in cells 1 and 4. Let's begin with cell 4. Since dissimilarity is measured in terms of resource availability differences between market phases, low dissimilarity means that resource availability is not a great deal better during p 1 than during p 2 . Resource scarcity has more effect on the rapid-growth oriented r-strategists than on the K-strategists because the skill-development of the latter depends on internal organizational processes rather than on external resource availability. K-strategist's skills also make possible to utilize available resources more efficiently. High variability makes things even worse for r-strategists: then, the deadly p 2 phase is not shorter than their growth period p 1 (Figure 1a) , giving even more chance for K-strategists to prevail. These two effects, together, bring selection's favor to K-strategists, just as predicted by our formal model (Table 6 : 4).
Cell 1 (Table 6 ) stands for conditions when environmental variability is low, so the competitive p 2 patch is substantially shorter than the preceding p 1 patch (Figure 1b) . This difference between the present and the previous case tips the selection balance in favor of rstrategists. The same applies to the last remaining mismatching result (cell 5) with the additional r-strategist advantage that here the abundant external resource supply in p 1 magnifies first mover advantages further (because of high environmental dissimilarity, Lemma 3). Thus, the conclusion implied by our formal RK theory (r-strategists are favored by selection) is intuitively justifiable.
Finally, we address the case of very fine grained environmental change (cell 9). Theorem 5 applies here as well: r-strategists, the analogues of crickets, are expected to prevail if qualitatively new resource conditions show up frequently. Then, efficient production oriented K-strategists have no time to reap the advantages of their efficient production, and they might even have no time to develop production efficiently. High-tech environments such as Silicon Valley open new business opportunities almost continuously for r-strategists. These first mover firms, typically founded by venture capital, have short life 230 G. Pe´li and J. Bruggeman expectancies. However, the few of them that hit the jackpot will grow large, become well visible, and contribute considerably to r-strategist population mass.
DISCUSSION
This article specified a new population dynamics model (CA) for quantitative environmental resource changes. CA has substantial similarities with two well-established theory fragments from organizational ecology (GS and RK) in terms of environmental modeling and organizational trade-offs. In all three cases, organizational population members face strategic trade-offs between short-term benefits (growth) and long-term security due to social capital (CA), to multiple skills (GS), or to high quality skills (RK). No security measure offers guaranteed survival, though, because expected overall growth in the long run may turn out being slow or even turn into decline. Thus, the trade-off strategy chosen ultimately depends on how organizational founders perceive their risks. This risk perception might be investigated along the lines of prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) in future research. Ecologists have earlier studied the gestation periods of new organizations (Carroll and Hannan, 2000, p. 339) . On the basis of detailed micro-studies one could assess how organizational founders perceive future risks, and how their perception influences choices in strategic trade-offs. The proposed logical formalizations highlight family resemblances, reflected by the common core, as well as differences, reflected by specific boundary conditions. Table 7 lists some of the differences and similarities between the three component arguments. The paper demonstrated that the predictions of CA, GS and RK obtain as theorems when the specific assumptions of the three population trade-offs K-strategists) are instantiated in the logical core machinery. We thereby hope to contribute part of the answer to the more general question: Which kind of organizational strategy is beneficial under which conditions? The temporal patterns of environmental change are the same in the three trade-off models, but the changes can be quantitative (CA, RK) or qualitative (GS). Qualitative resource change can also be expressed with quantities, though. Consider the set of relevant environmental resource variables, and denote the cardinality of this set with k. Then, all resource configurations can be expressed with a k-vector, where the resource sorts missing from the configuration are represented with zero components. The disappearance of all resource (quantitative change to winter in CA) corresponds to a zero vector. As quantitative resource change can be reduced to a special case of qualitative change, the Cricket and Ant story can be seen as a special case of ecology's niche width theory, namely when the level of some vital resource components become low in E 2 , and generalists cannot use their routines tuned to E 2 ; so they can only survive on their presumed higher stocks of reserves. In fact, arguments about niche width and organizational capacity allocation come together in niche width theory. Generalist organizations hold some capacity in reserve to ensure reliability of performance when conditions change, while ''some of the efficiency resulting from specialization derives from lower requirements for maintaining excess capacity'' (Hannan and Freeman 1989, p. 106) . As qualitative and quantitative resource changes can jointly occur, organizational populations may face the Cricket-Ant and the Specialist-Generalist trade-offs but at the same time. GS and CA can then be seen as the two marginal cases, when either the composition or the magnitude of resource supply counts, respectively.
The existence of a not-too-high carrying capacity (i.e., one that can be hit during the period of observation) poses another kind of quantitative resource constraint. Carrying capacity plays a role in RK, but not necessarily in CA. In the latter, it is the quantity of environmental resource inflow that changes between the first and the second period (summer and winter). In RK, the external resource inflow (demand) is present in both periods, but the expanding population absorbs all inflowing resources in the second period (p 2 ). What organizations experience according to both models is resource availability getting worse. In CA, organizations may prepare for adverse times by accumulating reserves, developing social ties and supportive institutions, whereas in RK, the more competitive K-strategists take over the resource share of their r-strategist cousins.
Finally, note that although the populations in the three trade-off models may interact, two out of three models (CA and GS) do not 232 G. Pe´li and J. Bruggeman assume interaction between organizations. The Cricket and the Ant (or the Specialist and the Generalist) need not even stay in the same market. Since the driver of selection process, resource change, is exogenous, the same selection outcomes obtain if the compared populations are located in separate but similar environments. In case of r-and K-strategists, it is population growth that generates resource scarcity, which in turn can be eased by the demise of some organizations. But even RK has a reading that need not assume competitive interaction between the two organization types. Under this interpretation, K-strategists' skill elaboration is not about becoming a tough competitor but about becoming more efficient at the exploitation of its own resources. This yields a ''pacifist'' version of RK in which K-strategists do not predate on others.
Can the work performed in this paper be seen as theory unification? Theory unification involves a common conceptual model that gives back the component theory fragments as special cases of the general theory. The proposed logical machinery fulfils this requirement to some extent. Substituting CA, GS or RK-specific constraints and parameters to the core-machinery, the respective theories obtain. However, in the presented logical formalization, the corresponding key objects in the three component models do not merge into one in the context of the general theory. For example, it is usually not the case that the same population can be seen as Ant, Generalist and K-strategists, when the focus of analysis shifts between quantitative, qualitative and carrying capacity related aspects of resource supply, respectively (although Generalists and Ants may coincide in certain populations, as we argued above; Brittain and Freeman (1980) even discuss r
